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AbsTrACT
background Virtually all existing evidence linking 
access to firearms to elevated risks of mortality and 
morbidity comes from ecological and case–control 
studies. To improve understanding of the health risks 
and benefits of firearm ownership, we launched a cohort 
study: the Longitudinal Study of Handgun Ownership and 
Transfer (LongSHOT).
Methods Using probabilistic matching techniques we 
linked three sources of individual- level, state- wide data 
in California: official voter registration records, an archive 
of lawful handgun transactions and all- cause mortality 
data. There were nearly 28.8 million unique voter 
registrants, 5.5 million handgun transfers and 3.1 million 
deaths during the study period (18 October 2004 to 31 
December 2016). The linkage relied on several identifying 
variables (first, middle and last names; date of birth; sex; 
residential address) that were available in all three data 
sets, deploying them in a series of bespoke algorithms.
results Assembly of the LongSHOT cohort commenced 
in January 2016 and was completed in March 2019. 
Approximately three- quarters of matches identified were 
exact matches on all link variables. The cohort consists 
of 28.8 million adult residents of California followed for 
up to 12.2 years. A total of 1.2 million cohort members 
purchased at least one handgun during the study period, 
and 1.6 million died.
Conclusions Three steps taken early may be 
particularly useful in enhancing the efficiency of large- 
scale data linkage: thorough data cleaning; assessment 
of the suitability of off- the- shelf data linkage packages 
relative to bespoke coding; and careful consideration of 
the minimum sample size and matching precision needed 
to support rigorous investigation of the study questions.
InTroduCTIon
Rates of civilian gun ownership are far higher in 
the USA than in any other country1 and rates of 
firearm- related death and injury in the USA are 
among the world’s highest.2 Over the last 30 years, 
evidence linking access to firearms to elevated 
risks of death and injury has grown. Nearly all of 
this evidence comes from ecological3–5 and case–
control6–13 studies. Only one cohort study14 has 
been conducted; this should not be surprising given 
the substantial data demands of the cohort design, 
legal barriers to the collection of population- wide 
information on firearm purchasing and ownership 
(ie, exposure data)15 and the dearth of funding 
in the USA for large- scale research on firearm 
violence.16 17
To help improve understanding of the health risks 
and benefits of firearm ownership, we launched the 
Longitudinal Study of Handgun Ownership and 
Transfer (LongSHOT) in 2016. The study’s broad 
goal is to produce the most complete and robust 
estimates to date of the causal effects of firearm 
ownership on the health of owners and their family 
members. Our first task was to assemble a cohort 
by linking three sources of individual- level, state- 
wide data from California: official voter registra-
tion records, an archive of firearm transactions 
and mortality data. With nearly 29 million unique 
voter registrants, 5.5 million handgun transfers 
and 3.1 million deaths during our study period 
(18 October 2004 to 31 December 2016), cohort 
assembly was large in scale and complex.
In this article, we describe the linkage methodology 
we developed and implemented to create the cohort. 
We conclude with some lessons learnt, which may be 
useful to other researchers embarking on large- scale 
data linkage projects involving public records.
dATA sourCes
Voter registration data
We sought to build the cohort around a source of 
longitudinal, individual- level information on Cali-
fornia residents—one that captured as much of the 
adult population as possible, while also providing 
accurate, up- to- date information on individuals’ 
residential location. We considered several possible 
data sources (see section I of the online supplemen-
tary appendix) before settling on California’s State-
wide Voter Registration Database (SVRD).18 The 
SVRD has several features that made it attractive for 
our purposes. First, it captures a majority of adult 
residents of the state: in our study period, regis-
trants accounted for approximately 74% of voting- 
eligible residents and 62% of all adult residents.19 20 
Second, the SVRD contains information on each 
registrant’s name, sex, date of birth and principal 
residential address—all important variables to our 
study goals. Third, the California Secretary of State 
is required to keep the SVRD up to date with addi-
tions (eg, registrations by new state residents and 
residents who attain voting age) and removals (eg, 
deregistrations due to death, relocation or incar-
ceration). The mandatory updates include weekly 
cross- checks against death and felony records21 and 
monthly cross- checks against the US Postal Service 
Change of Address Database.22 Registrants cannot 
receive a mail- in ballot or cast a valid vote if they 
are not registered at the correct address, so they 
face relatively strong incentives to update their 
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Table 1 Summary of data linkage steps used to assemble the LongSHOT cohort
step blocking key
Focus of linkage 
algorithms and manual 
reviews step rationale
Percentage of all matches identified
Purchasers- voter file
(n≈1.2 m)
deaths- voter file
(n≈1.7 m)
A Same date of birth+same residential 
address
Name fields Identifies highest probability matches 80.12% 79.74%
B Same date of birth+similar first and last 
names
Name fields, address fields Removes address as a blocking criterion to 
capture relocators between SVRD extract date 
and purchase/death date.
17.92% 15.64%
C Same date of birth+both persons 
female+similar first and middle names
Name fields, address fields Same as step B, except also allows changes of 
last names among women.
0.73% 0.06%
D Same address Name fields, date of birth 
field
Removes date of birth from blocking key to 
allow for errors in this field.
1.24% 4.56%
LongSHOT, Longitudinal Study of Handgun Ownership and Transfer; SVRD, Statewide Voter Registration Database.
address information. Finally, snapshots of the SVRD are taken 
regularly and archived.
In sum, SVRD extracts present a large sample of adults known 
to be alive and residing in California on the extract date. We 
obtained 13 historical extracts of the SVRD that spanned the 
study period and were spaced approximately 1 year apart (see 
section II of the online supplementary appendix).
dealer record of sale database
Nearly all transfers of firearms in California—including transfers 
between private parties, gun show sales, gifts and loans—must be 
transacted through a licensed dealer.23 Dealers relay electroni-
cally details of transfers and transferees to the California Depart-
ment of Justice (CalDOJ), where they are logged into the Dealer 
Record of Sale (DROS) database and stored permanently.24 
Handgun transfers in California have adhered to this process 
for decades, creating a state- wide archive of lawful handgun 
transfers. It was optional for licensed dealers to log information 
on long gun transfers into the DROS database until 1 January 
2014, when it became mandatory. We obtained DROS records 
on over 10 million handgun and long gun transfers made over a 
32- year period (1985–2016), although this report focuses on the 
5.5 million transfers recorded during the study period.
Mortality data
The California Death Statistical Master Files are the state’s offi-
cial mortality records.25 They contain detailed information on 
deaths among state residents, including deaths that occur out 
of state. The records include the decedent’s name, sex, date of 
birth, race, and residential address, as well as the date, cause 
(International Classification of Diseases, Tenth Revision code) 
and location of death. We obtained data on all recorded adult 
deaths from 2000 through 2016.
oVerVIew oF lInkAge ProCess
We used probabilistic data linkage methods to match the firearm 
transfer records and mortality records, respectively, to the SVRD 
extracts at the person level. The link variables, available in all three 
principal data sets, were: first name, middle name (or initial), last 
name (and former last name), date of birth (day/month/year), sex 
and geocoded residential address. Candidate pairs that matched on 
all link variables were automatically accepted as matches.
However, the bulk of the linkage effort involved developing 
and applying algorithms to detect matches with imperfect agree-
ment on one or more of the link variables. Variation across 
public records in how an individual’s information is recorded 
is common and occurs for a variety of reasons, including 
recording mistakes (eg, misspellings, entry errors), inconsistent 
use of certain identifying fields (eg, middle name, residential unit 
number) and normal temporal change among accurate identi-
fiers (eg, new residential address, changes of last name).
The mortality–SVRD linkage was conducted between 
November 2017 and October 2018 and the DROS–SVRD 
linkage was conducted between October 2018 and March 2019. 
Study data were stored on secure servers at Stanford’s Center for 
Health Policy and all linkage work was performed in a secure 
computing environment.
TeMPorAl sTruCTure oF lInkAge
We conceived LongSHOT as an open cohort in which cohort 
members would come under observation on the date of the first 
SVRD extract in which they appeared and remain under obser-
vation until the day before the date of the next voter file extract 
in which they did not appear, death, or the study end date, 
whichever came first. Our approach to data linkage mapped 
on to this design. Linkage was segmented according to the time 
intervals between consecutive SVRD extracts, with purchasers 
and deceased within each time interval eligible to match to voter 
registrants named in the SVRD extract that marked the beginning 
of the interval. This segmented approach meant that assembly of 
the cohort proceeded in 26 discrete ‘interval links’—13 for the 
mortality–SVRD linkage and 13 for the DROS–SVRD linkage 
(see section III of the online supplementary appendix for further 
details).
lInkAge sTePs And AlgorIThMs
Within each interval link, we applied a suite of linkage algo-
rithms. The algorithms were organised into four consecutive steps 
(table 1). The chief function of the algorithms was to sort candi-
date pairs into three groups: (1) those with very high probability 
of being matches (which we called ‘auto rule- ins’); (2) those with 
very low probability of being matches (‘auto rule- outs’); and (3) 
the rest (‘manual checks’). The methodology used to develop the 
algorithms is described in section IV of the online supplementary 
appendix, and the algorithms themselves are described in section V.
MAnuAl reVIew
A member of our study team examined each candidate pair 
assigned to manual check bins in the DROS–SVRD linkage 
(n≈90 000) and the mortality–SVRD linkage (n≈276 000), 
comparing the available information to decide whether the 
records referred to the same person. We also subjected subsam-
ples of pairs assigned to the auto rule- in and auto rule- out bins to 
manual review (details of those reviews are provided in section 
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Table 2 Inter- rater and intrarater reliability of manual review
dros–sVrd linkage
(n=500 candidate pairs)
Mortality–sVrd linkage
(n=500 candidate pairs)
Inter- rater Intrarater Inter- rater Intrarater
Expected agreement by chance alone (%) 50.51 50.60 51.79 52.10
Observed agreement (95% CI) 94.20% (91.78% to 96.08%) 93.40% (90.86% to 95.41%) 91.80% (89.04% to 94.05%) 92.60% (89.94% to 
94.74%)
Kappa (95% CI) 0.88 (0.83 to 0.91) 0.87 (0.82 to 0.90) 0.83 (0.77 to 0.87) 0.85 (0.79 to 0.89)
DROS, Dealer Record of Sale database; SVRD, Statewide Voter Registration Database.
Table 3 Techniques for identifying matched records with discrepant first, middle and/or last names
extent of discrepancy source of name discrepancy retrieval technique Place of application*
Slight or moderate Misspelling, entry errors, and so on Jaro- Winkler distance Throughout all steps
Phonetically similar but different spelling Encoded all names using the Soundex function in R to 
allow matching of phonetically similar names36
Throughout all steps
Shortened or expanded/hyphenated versions of 
same names
Allowed for substring matches between name fields Step A: name bins 3, 4, 5
Step B: name bins 2a, 4
Step D: name bin 5
Extreme Use of nicknames and contractions (eg, 
Elizabeth—Betty, Tommy Joe—TJ)
Allowed for matches to common nicknames (see 
section VII of online supplementary appendix)
Step A: name bins 1, 2, 6, 7, 9
Step B: blocking key; substep 1 bin 2a, 2b, 3a, 
4; substeps 3(2)(a) and (b)
Step C: blocking key; substep 2
Step D: blocking key; name bin 1
Change or concatenation of last names among 
females
Relaxed last name matching criteria Step C
Allowed for matches between current last names 
(in purchaser and mortality records) and former last 
names (in voter records)
Throughout all steps
Switches in name order Allowed for reverse matching of first- middle and 
first- last
Step A: name bins 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 9
Step D: name bins 1, 5
*Refers to locations in the charts of linkage algorithms provided in section V of the online supplementary appendix.
VI of the online supplementary appendix). During the DROS–
SVRD linkage, manual reviewers were blinded to the results of 
the earlier mortality–SVRD linkage.
In the context of a study whose goal is to quantify the rela-
tionship between firearm ownership and injury risk, it is unclear 
whether overmatching or undermatching poses the greater 
threat of bias. (The answer depends on the exposure and 
outcome profiles of mismatched records, which is unknown.) A 
plausible consequence is a bias to the null in analyses estimating 
differences in mortality risk between handgun owners and non- 
owners. Given these considerations, we adopted a simple balance 
of probabilities standard: if the reviewer judged a candidate pair 
more likely than not to be a match, it was called one, otherwise 
it was called a non- match.
To assess inter- rater and intrarater reliability of the manual 
reviews, we randomly selected 1000 candidate pairs from across 
all manual check bins—500 from the DROS–SVRD linkage and 
500 from the mortality–SVRD linkage. The two reviewers who 
conducted the original manual reviews reviewed all 1000 pairs. 
Inter- rater reliability measures were calculated by comparing 
reviewer A’s determination in the original review to reviewer B’s 
determination in the reliability review; intrareliability measures 
compared reviewer A or B’s determination in the original review to 
the same reviewer’s determination in the reliability review. Table 2 
reports the results of the reliability testing.
PreMATChIng FIreArM PurChAsers
In the DROS database, each firearm transferee has a unique iden-
tification number that allows CalDOJ to easily identify multiple 
acquisitions by the same person over time. Voter registrants in 
the SVRD also have a unique identification number. Together, 
these two identifiers provided an efficient method of linking to 
the SVRD purchasers who acquired multiple handguns during 
the study period. If purchaser X was matched to voter regis-
trant Y in the first interval link, for example, our first move after 
generating the pool of candidate pairs in subsequent interval 
links was to ‘pre- match’ all X- Y candidate pairs in the pool. 
Since many firearm owners—both nationally26 and within Cali-
fornia27—acquire multiple weapons, this short cut helped reduce 
the manual review workload, especially in later intervals.
ProbAbIlIsTIC MATChIng oF key VArIAbles
Approximately 72% of the matches identified in the DROS–
SVRD linkage and the mortality–SVRD linkage, respectively, 
matched exactly on all link variables. While these proportions are 
high and bolster confidence in match accuracy, they also indicate 
that limiting the linkage to such ‘perfect’ matches would have 
missed matching a non- trivial number of purchases and deaths in 
the cohort. To avoid these false negatives, our linkage algorithms 
applied fuzzy matching techniques to each link variable.
Fuzzy matching of names
Table 3 summarises the techniques used to retrieve matches with 
name field discrepancies. The most widely used of these tech-
niques was an edit distance measure of the degree of discrepancy 
between imperfectly matched names. After testing several options 
(eg, Levenshtein, Damerau- Levenshtein, Jaro, Jaro- Winkler), we 
chose the Jaro- Winkler distance algorithm because it performed 
best in our data. This algorithm scores similarity between two 
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Table 4 Additional variables used to inform match determinations in hard cases
Consideration Intuition Place of application*
Rarity of name in the population
(see section IX of the online 
supplementary appendix)
Two records with same name but minor discrepancies on another link variable 
are more likely to be the same if first, middle or last name is uncommon.
Step B: substep 2, substep 3(2)(d)
Step C: substep 2
Step D: name bins 3, 4, 8
Geodistance between discrepant 
addresses
Persons who move addresses are more likely to relocate near (eg, same city or 
county) than far (eg, distant city or county).
Step A: all name bins
Step B: substep 3(2)
Step C: substep 1
Step D: auto rule- in bin B; routing rule for name bin 
11; name bins 1, 5
Geodistance+rurality All else equal, two records that match on all variables except address are more 
likely to be true matches if both are in the same sparsely populated area than if 
both are in the same densely populated area.
Manual review only
Time interval between discrepant dates 
of birth
When errors in (or intended alternate uses of) birth dates occur, the conflicting 
dates are more likely to be proximate than distant.
Step D: blocking key; auto rule- in bin D
*Refers to locations in the charts of linkage algorithms provided in section V of the online supplementary appendix.
character strings on a scale from 0 (none) to 1 (exact match); 
the score is based on the number of characters the strings have 
in common and places extra weight on matches between early 
characters in the strings.28 We incorporated scores from the Jaro- 
Winkler algorithm into several blocking keys and many algo-
rithms. In our data, name fields with scores between 0.90 and 
0.99 generally indicated a high likelihood that the names had 
minor discrepancies but were the same, scores between 0.77 and 
0.89 indicated possible name matches, and name matches among 
pairs with scores below 0.77 were uncommon.
Edit distance metrics such as the Jaro- Winkler do not help 
identify matches between name fields that are very or completely 
different. Extreme discrepancies in name fields across public 
records pertaining to the same person occur for various reasons. 
For example, first and middle names are frequently used with vari-
ations (eg, nicknames, initials only) or interchangeably. Also, in our 
linkage, some people (mostly women) changed their recorded last 
name in the interval between the date of the SVRD extract and the 
date of their gun purchase or death. The lower section of table 3 
describes the techniques we used to detect matches among records 
with extreme name mismatches. The most important of these tech-
niques was nickname matching, details of which are provided in 
section VII of the online supplementary appendix.
Fuzzy matching of residential addresses
To facilitate address matching we geocoded residential addresses 
for all DROS, mortality and voter records using StreetMap 
Premium for ArcGIS software29 and OpenCage Geocoder.30 A 
total of 98% of the geocodes assigned to records were based on 
exact matches to a dwelling rooftop; 1% of geocodes were ‘ties’, 
indicating a location very near the address but uncertainty over 
the specific dwelling; geocodes could not be identified for the 
remaining 1% of records.
To avoid missing matches with slight geocode discrepan-
cies—owing, for example, to minor discrepancies in the address 
strings or inconsistent use of unit/apartment numbers—the step 
A blocking key and several of the algorithms relaxed the number 
of decimal places to which the geocodes of candidate pairs had 
to match. (Given California’s location on the globe, geocodes 
are precise to approximately 10 m at the fourth decimal place, 
100 m at the third decimal place and 1 km at the second decimal 
place.)31 To avoid overmatching, use of fuzzy geocode matching 
triggered stringent match requirements on other link variables. 
We also generated ‘geodistances’—a measure of the distance 
between imperfectly matched geocodes in candidate pairs—and 
used these both to constrain fuzzy geocode matches and priori-
tise pairs in manual review.
Fuzzy matching of birth dates
Unlike name and address, record error is usually the only expla-
nation for the same person having discrepant birth dates across 
public records. We insisted on exact date of birth matches in three 
of the four linkage steps. The blocking key for step D used less 
stringent criteria on this variable to create a pool of candidate pairs 
with probable errors in one of the birth dates and exact or high- 
probability matches on the other link variables. Examples of errors 
in birth dates within pairs that were judged to be matches are 
described in section VIII of the online supplementary appendix.
resolVIng unCerTAIn MATChes
Do two records for Jane L Garcia with the same date of birth 
but residential addresses a mile apart refer to the same person? 
What about two records for Abdul Horatio Jones with birth 
dates 5 months apart and two different addresses that are located 
along the same small street? Neither computer algorithms nor 
manual review can confidently answer these questions.
We generated several additional variables to aid our decision- 
making in such ‘hard’ cases. The variables and the probabilistic 
intuition that motivated them are described in table 4. We made 
some use of these variables in the linkage algorithms, particu-
larly name rarity (see section IX of the online supplementary 
appendix), but their primary use was to inform subjective 
decision- making during manual review.
MulTIMATChes And ConFlICTIng MATChes
We generally matched with replacement. Thus, within interval 
links we allowed a deceased or purchaser to match to more than 
one voter registrant and, conversely, for a registrant to match 
to multiple deceased or purchasers; for purchasers, both forms 
of multimatching were also allowed across interval links. After 
all linkage steps were complete, manual review of these anom-
alous clusters functioned as a form of quality control, allowing 
identification of the true matches and elimination of the false 
ones and, in a few instances, highlighting errors (eg, duplicate 
records) in a component data set.
lessons leArnT
We began assembly of the LongSHOT cohort armed with a good 
working knowledge of data linkage methods. The literature in 
this area has blossomed in recent years,32–34 and several members 
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Table 5 Characteristics of sharp and fuzzy matches*
dros–sVrd linkage Mortality–sVrd linkage
Matches 
identified in 
step A
Matches 
identified in 
step b, C or d
Matches 
identified in 
step A
Matches 
identified in 
step b, C or d
Male (%) 86.05 85.45 51.96 48.81
Age†
  Mean (years) 45 38 73 73
  Median (years) 45 35 76 77
Race/ethnicity
  White (%) 74.52 69.33 70.73 66.33
  Hispanic (%) 13.18 15.76 13.30 14.41
  Black (%) 3.78 5.79 8.34 11.82
  Asian (%) 5.73 5.80 7.00 6.55
  Other (%) 2.79 3.32 0.63 0.90
Residential location‡
  Urban (%) 81.96 81.16 87.80 87.41
  Suburban (%) 12.22 10.95 6.94 6.10
  Large rural town 
(%)
3.11 3.46 3.11 2.64
  Small rural town 
(%)
2.28 2.48 1.61 2.37
*In both linkages, all variables in the step A match are significantly different (p<0.01) from 
step B/C/D matches.
†Refers to cohort members’ age at the midpoint of their observation period.
‡Categories are based on the US Census Bureau’s urban- rural classification system and refer 
to cohort members’ residential location at time they entered the cohort.
DROS, Dealer Record of Sale database; SVRD, Statewide Voter Registration Database.
Table 6 Key challenges to address in future analyses of the 
LongSHOT cohort exploring the relationship between handgun 
ownership and mortality
Challenge description
Mismeasurement of 
exposure
Non- handgun owners may in fact be owners due to, for 
example, failure to match their purchases in probabilistic 
linkage, unlawful handgun acquisition and purchases made 
prior to 1985. Non- handgun owners may own unobserved 
long guns.
Unobserved 
confounding
Relevant differences may exist between handgun owners 
and non- owners that are not measured in the linked data 
(eg, incidence of mental illness, risk- taking propensity).
Restriction of cohort to 
voter file registrants in 
California
Generalisations to non- registrants in California and to 
residents of other states may be impaired by relevant 
unobserved heterogeneity.
LongSHOT, Longitudinal Study of Handgun Ownership and Transfer.
of our team had record linkage experience from previous projects 
(although on a much smaller scale). None of this fully prepared 
us for the scale and complexity of the LongSHOT linkage, nor 
spared us from a multitude of wrong turns and mistakes along 
the way. Lessons were hard won. Here are four we wished we 
had known or more fully appreciated at the outset.
First, we spent about 10 person- months cleaning the compo-
nent data sets before commencing linkage. This was enough time 
to correct many errors and irregularities; we planned to deal 
with the rest once the analytical data set was formed. Deferral 
was a mistake. As the linkage progressed, problems discovered 
in match results exposed additional anomalies in the underlying 
data sets, forcing us to pause several times for supplementary 
cleaning. Most of these anomalies could have been found and 
addressed with more thorough prelinkage cleaning, and dealing 
with them at that stage would have been far more efficient. A 
related lesson is that presumptions about the cleanliness of vital 
administrative databases, including those for recording deaths 
and voter registration, should be set aside.
Second, we spent time in the first year experimenting with 
off- the- shelf matching packages (eg, Link Plus, G- Link, Record 
Linkage package in R) before eventually deciding to write our 
own code. Some of the packages had to be ruled out because 
they could not accommodate the volume demands of our 
linkage. However, our main reservation turned out to be an 
inability to clearly see, understand and, when necessary, modify 
the matching machinery in these products. We took too long to 
figure out that this was not a linkage for point- and- shoot mode 
and that we needed full manual control of the settings.
Third, there were several opportunities to pare back the scale of 
the linkage. In particular, it was always evident that we would have 
abundant non- owners, and in the final cohort 90.3% of members 
experienced neither the exposure nor the outcome of interest. A 
reduced form approach, such as a matched cohort design, would 
have alleviated substantial manual review burden, probably without 
materially compromising statistical power or precision. We chose 
not to downsize in this way because future phases of LongSHOT 
will consider additional research questions—including risks of 
household- level exposure to firearms—for which a less restricted 
design will have important advantages. Had such ancillary consid-
erations not been on the horizon, however, a reduced form design 
would have been the smart choice.
Finally, the single most important determinant of workload 
in a linkage of this kind is the degree of matching precision 
sought. As noted above, nearly three- quarters of the purchaser 
and mortality matches came from perfect matches on our link 
variables. Stopping there would have dramatically reduced the 
workload, and doing so may be appropriate for studies in which 
the loss of statistical power is acceptable and risks of bias and 
generalisability from false negatives are relatively low.
We pressed on to retrieve imperfect matches as best we could 
for several reasons. The public health importance and political 
sensitivity of our topic summoned a high degree of precision. In 
addition, we predicted, correctly, that fuzzy matches recovered 
through steps B, C and D would differ systematically from those 
identified in the relatively pristine step A matches. Table 5 shows 
that purchasers matched in later steps tended to be younger, and 
both purchasers and deceased matched in later steps were more 
likely to be members of racial or ethnic minorities. These are 
important population subgroups for understanding patterns and 
causes of gun violence. Moreover, disproportionately excluding 
them from consideration would have compounded the fact that 
these same subgroups are already under- represented in a cohort 
anchored in voter registration.35
ConClusIon
Over 3 years of concerted effort we assembled the LongSHOT 
cohort, which consists of 28.8 million adults followed for up 
to 12.2 years. A total of 1.2 million cohort members purchased 
at least one handgun during the study period and 1.6 million 
died—nearly 14 500 of them from firearm- related injuries. Anal-
yses of the cohort will help advance understanding of the effects 
of handgun ownership on cause- specific mortality risks; in the 
long run, it will serve as a platform for addressing other ques-
tions about the health risks and benefits of firearm ownership for 
owners and households.
Although the cohort is the largest assembled to date for 
addressing these questions, certain design choices we made and 
limitations of the data sets we used to form the cohort mean that 
future analyses of cohort data must grapple with various meth-
odological challenges; table 6 foreshadows several key ones. We 
hope that this account of our methods and travails in creating 
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Methodology
the LongSHOT cohort may help other public health researchers 
improve the quality and efficiency of their own data linkage 
efforts.
what is already known on this subject
 ► Existing research provides substantial evidence of a positive 
association between firearm availability and risk of firearm- 
related death and injury.
 ► Virtually no cohort studies of this relationship have been 
conducted—chiefly, because population- wide information on 
firearm availability is difficult to obtain.
what this study adds
 ► We demonstrate the feasibility of linking public records from 
multiple sources (voter registration files, archival information 
on firearm transfers, and mortality data) to produce a large 
cohort in which handgun ownership and death are observed
 ► Future analyses of the cohort will help advance 
understanding of the effects of handgun ownership on cause- 
specific mortality risks.
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